Criticism of Directive Principles

The most significant criticism leveled against the DPSPs is their non-justiciable character (Article 37). Because they are not enforceable by courts, critics have dismissed them using various disparaging descriptions:

• "Pious Superfluities" / "Moral Precepts" (K.T. Shah): Suggesting they are well-intentioned but legally powerless ideals without practical teeth.
• "New Year's Resolutions": Implying they are like resolutions made with good intentions at the beginning of a year but often broken or forgotten, indicating a lack of serious commitment to their implementation.
• "A Manifesto of Aims and Aspirations": Suggesting they are more like a political party's election manifesto, full of promises but not legally binding.
• "A Cheque on a Bank Payable only when the resources of the bank permit" (K.T. Shah): Highlighting that their implementation depends on the State's capacity and will, not on a legal right of citizens.
• Sir Ivor Jennings called them "pious aspirations" and doubted their utility.
• K.C. Wheare termed them as a "manifesto of aims and aspirations" and opined that they might lead to "needless litigation" or "political controversy."

Critics point out that the DPSPs are not arranged in a logical or systematic manner. They appear as a collection of diverse directives without a clear, consistent underlying philosophy or a coherent sequence.

• Socialist, Gandhian, and Liberal-Intellectual principles are intermingled rather than being grouped thematically.
• Some directives are broad and general (e.g., promote welfare of people - Art 38), while others are very specific (e.g., prohibit cow slaughter - Art 48).
• There is no clear hierarchy or order of importance among the principles.

Some critics argue that certain Directive Principles are conservative or reflect outdated political and economic philosophies of the 19th century (e.g., Fabian socialism, some Gandhian ideals) and may not be entirely suitable for the complexities and demands of a modern, globalized 21st-century India.

• Example: The emphasis on cottage industries (Art 43) might be seen as out of sync with modern industrial development, though it has relevance for rural employment.
• Prohibition (Art 47) is seen by some as an outdated moralistic stance that infringes on individual choice and leads to revenue loss and illicit trade.
• Some aspects of state control envisaged in socialist principles might be seen as conflicting with liberal economic policies.

The non-justiciable but "fundamental in governance" nature of DPSPs can potentially lead to constitutional conflicts:

• Conflict between Centre and States: The Centre might issue directions to a state government to implement certain DPSPs. If the state fails to comply, the Centre could potentially use this (among other grounds) to justify the imposition of President's Rule (Article 356) under Article 365 (effect of failure to comply with, or to give effect to, directions given by the Union). This could undermine federalism and lead to political manipulation.
• Conflict between President/Governor and Council of Ministers: The President (at the Centre) or the Governor (in States) might refuse to assent to a bill passed by the legislature if they believe it violates DPSPs. Since the President/Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, such a conflict would essentially be between different interpretations of constitutional obligations within the executive or between executive and legislature. This could lead to constitutional deadlocks.

Several terms and phrases used in the DPSPs are considered vague, ambiguous, and not clearly defined.

• Examples: "living wage" (Art 43), "social order" (Art 38), "adequate means of livelihood" (Art 39a), "cottage industries" (Art 43), "intoxicating drinks" (Art 47), "scientific lines" for agriculture (Art 48).

• While non-justiciability is a valid point, the description as "pious superfluities" underestimates their moral and political significance. Article 37 makes them "fundamental in governance" and a "duty of the State."
• They have demonstrably influenced legislation and policy (e.g., land reforms, labour laws, Panchayati Raj, environmental laws, RTE).
• Judicial use: Courts use them to interpret FRs and test reasonableness of restrictions. This gives them indirect enforceability.
• Public opinion and electoral accountability act as sanctions, ensuring no government can afford to ignore them completely.
• So, they are more than just "pious hopes"; they are active guiding principles for state action towards a welfare state.

• The lack of neat classification does not necessarily detract from the substance or importance of individual directives.
• The eclectic mix reflects the diverse aspirations of the Indian national movement and the framers' attempt to create a comprehensive vision encompassing various ideologies.
• The underlying theme of a welfare state and socio-economic justice provides a unifying thread, making their arrangement secondary to their purpose.

• While some principles might seem to have an older ideological flavor, their core objectives often remain relevant or can be reinterpreted in contemporary contexts (e.g., "cottage industries" can be linked to MSMEs, rural employment, and sustainable development today).
• The Constitution is a living document, and the interpretation and application of DPSPs can evolve with time.
• The addition of new DPSPs (like Art 48A for environment protection, Art 39A for legal aid, Art 43B for cooperatives) through amendments shows their dynamism and adaptability.

• The theoretical possibility of constitutional conflict (Centre-State, President-CoM) due to DPSPs exists.
• However, in practice, such conflicts based solely on DPSP implementation have been rare. Conflicts usually arise from a mix of political, financial, and other constitutional factors.
• The primary arena of DPSP-related conflict has been with Fundamental Rights, where the judiciary has played a crucial balancing role, leading to doctrines like 'harmony and balance'.

• The alleged vagueness of terms can also be seen as providing necessary flexibility to future governments and legislatures to adapt the principles to specific circumstances and evolving societal understanding.
• Precise, rigid definitions might have made them too rigid and quickly outdated.
• The general intent and spirit behind these terms are usually discernible, and judicial interpretation often provides clarity where needed, filling in the gaps.

• Many criticisms stem from comparing DPSPs with justiciable Fundamental Rights, which is a misunderstanding of their distinct nature and purpose. DPSPs are long-term goals for the State, not immediate individual rights.
• While some criticisms have validity (e.g., slow implementation of some DPSPs, potential for political rhetoric without substance), the overall impact of DPSPs on India's governance and socio-economic development has been significant and largely positive.
• They have served as a constant reminder of the State's responsibilities and have provided a framework for progressive action, pushing the nation towards its welfare state aspirations.